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Abstract
Adapting behaviour according to internal or external feedback is a fundamental
property of cognitive control. For example, humans tend to slow down when they
make mistakes, a process called post-error slowing (PES), which has previously
received extensive attention in research on response inhibition. However, whether
PES is actually an adaptive process which helps avoid future mistakes or a
maladaptive one which siphons cognitive resources is still not clear.
The overall aim of the work in this thesis was to investigate how post-error
slowing contributes to the stabilization of performance after errors and which brain
areas are involved in this response inhibition process. We did this by combining
behavioural experiments, computational modelling and neuroimaging techniques
to provide a comprehensive analysis of latent decision processes and their neural
correlates.
Specifically, in Study I, we analyzed data from a probabilistic reinforcement
learning task in combination with functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging to
explore which brain regions signalled enhanced future post-error slowing when
receiving negative feedback. On a behavioural level, we studied whether PES
was associated with how well participants learned, as assessed in a later test
phase. We showed that post-error slowing was associated with brain activity in
a central cognitive control region, the right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) as well
as brain regions in occipital cortex which overlapped with the representation of
absolute prediction errors, a measure reflecting deviance from expectations, i.e.,
surprise at feedback. In Study II, we found that cortical thickness in rIFG as
a measure of grey matter integrity was related to inter-individual differences in
post-error slowing, both for direct next trials and trials further apart in time.
This analysis was supported by a drift diffusion model of the underlying decision
processes, which demonstrated that an increased decision boundary after an error,
indicating enhanced response caution, was related to cortical thickness variability,
particularly in anterior parts of the rIFG. Finally, in Study III we used drift
diffusion modelling on a large-scale behavioural dataset during a visual search task
to illuminate decision processes of up to five trials after an error and how post-error
adaptation benefits accuracy recovery several trials after the error. Post-error
slowing was marked by both adaptive and non-adaptive decision processes which
changed dynamically over several trials after an error. While adaptive increases
in decision threshold were sustained for several trials after an error, reductions
in evidence accumulation only transiently affected performance on the next trial
after the error. Further, post-error increases in response caution and evidence
accumulation were also associated with better performance on future trials.
These studies illustrate that there is valuable information to be gained about
response inhibition processes beyond looking at the simple relation of post-error
slowing and accuracy. Computational modelling allowed us to compartmentalize
various decision processes and relate adaptations in these processes directly to
brain anatomy. We hope the results from the studies presented in this thesis can
provide a framework for future work on how the brain learns from mistakes and
adapts to a continually changing environment.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
One of the lines of experimental investigation most diligently followed of
late years is that of the ascertainment of the time occupied by nervous
events. [...] The question is, What happens inside of us, either in brain
or in mind? and to answer that we must analyze just what processes the
reaction involves.
– William James, Principles of Psychology
1.1 Conceptual overview
Both on the behavioural and neural level tremendous progress has been made over
the past decades in the understanding of how stimulus values lead to action and how
actions can be constrained by exerting cognitive control over them. However, these
two processes of reinforcement learning and cognitive control have predominantly
been investigated in isolation, particularly in neuroscience. Therefore, the question
of how appropriate behavioural adjustment according to feedback improves value
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learning has only recently come into the spotlight. This question will stand in the
center of this thesis.
I will start by providing separate overviews of the fields of cognitive control and
reinforcement learning and afterwards I am going to highlight interactions between
the two fields, particularly in the realm of mental disorders.
1.2 Cognitive control
Cognitive control refers to a heterogeneous concept, subsuming a variety of mental
functions which include, but are not limited to, working memory, task-set switching,
response selection and response inhibition (Lenartowicz, Kalar, Congdon, &
Poldrack, 2010; Ridderinkhof, Wildenberg, Segalowitz, & Carter, 2004; Sabb
et al., 2008; Ullsperger, Danielmeier, & Jocham, 2014). As a whole it can be
defined as “the ability to regulate, coordinate, and sequence thoughts and actions
in accordance with internally maintained behavioral goals” (Braver, 2012). In this
thesis I will mainly focus on behavioural and neural aspects of response inhibition
in order to implement adaptive behaviour.
1.2.1 Post-error slowing (PES)
An example of response inhibition is the phenomenon of post-error slowing (PES).
After making a mistake or receiving negative feedback in a task, the next response
on similar trials will often require a longer reaction time than pre-error responses
(Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Kerns et al., 2004).
Various accounts have been proposed to explain the psychological correlates to this
slowing. On the one hand, non-functional accounts of PES contend that the slowing
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happens because of the low frequency of errors in many tasks which evokes a general
orienting response (Notebaert et al., 2009) or that post-error monitoring acts as
a bottleneck, limiting resources of decision processes after the error (Jentzsch &
Dudschig, 2009). A common motive among the functional accounts of PES on
the other hand is to argue for an increase in response caution (Botvinick, Braver,
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Dutilh et al., 2012b) on the trial following the error
which leads to a speed-accuracy trade-off (Bogacz, Wagenmakers, Forstmann, &
Nieuwenhuis, 2010; Fitts, 1966; Heitz, 2014; Laming, 1979; Steinhauser, Ernst, &
Ibald, 2017).
PES is often quantified in response time tasks such as Go/No-Go tasks, where
the response time after an error is subtracted from the response time on the trial
before the error (Dutilh et al., 2012a). Similarly, it can be calculated in relation
to a comparable previous trial, even if that trial is set apart in time by several
seconds (Cavanagh, Frank, Klein, & Allen, 2010; Frank, Moustafa, Haughey,
Curran, & Hutchison, 2007). While the former might reflect a motoric or more
general attentional adjustment, the latter also takes into account the adaptation of
response speed in accordance to conflict between two stimuli with similar values.
For example, in a probabilistic reinforcement learning task such as we have
employed in Study I and II, negative feedback should trigger response speed
decreases the next time a particular symbol pair is seen, which would show an
adaptive regulation of response time in accordance with feedback (Figure 1.1A).
This response time slowing could be useful to gather more evidence when stimulus
values are more similar to each other and therefore harder to distinguish, i.e.,
during conflict (Cavanagh et al., 2011; Frank et al., 2015; Zaghloul et al., 2012).
On the other hand, errors on a visual search task such as the one we used in
Study III might be expected to have the largest effect on trials directly after the
error since the task is structured deterministically and errors provide information
about necessary adaptation on the immediate next trial (e.g., “I missed this angry
12
Figure 1.1: The two different kinds of post-error slowing investigated in this thesis.
(A) PES during a probabilistic reinforcement learning task as employed in our
Studies I and II. Here, PES (∆RT) is calculated by subtracting the RT on the
error trial from the RT when the same pair trial next appears again. (B) PES
during a visual search task as used in our Study III. In this study, ∆RT is
calculated by subtracting the RT on the trial after the error from the RT on the
trial before the error if both trial conditions are the same (in this case all neutral
faces).
face, therefore I need to check for this particular face shape more carefully”, see
Figure 1.1B).
1.2.2 The cognitive control network in the brain
Cognitive control processes are implicated to rely on lateral prefrontal brain areas
(see e.g., the review by Miller, 2000) and anterior cingulate cortex as indicated
in a lesion mapping review with a variety of neuropsychological tasks related to
response inhibition, conflict monitoring and switching (Gläscher et al., 2012). A
particular network that implements response inhibition or stopping depending on
the task at hand has been proposed by Aron and colleagues (Figure 1.2A, Aron,
Behrens, Smith, Frank, & Poldrack, 2007; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2014).
Within this network, right inferior frontal gyrus (rIFG) plays a key role in response
inhibition via its connections to basal ganglia (subthalamic nucleus, STN) and
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presupplementary motor area (pre-SMA). Anatomical connections between the
areas in this cognitive control network show good test-retest reliability as assessed
in a recent diffusion weighted imaging study (Boekel, Forstmann, & Keuken, 2017).
PES has been linked to posterior medial frontal cortex (pMFC) activity, increased
activity in task-relevant areas and decreased activity in task-irrelevant cortical
areas (Danielmeier, Eichele, Forstmann, Tittgemeyer, & Ullsperger, 2011; J. A.
King, Korb, Cramon, & Ullsperger, 2010). The interesting dynamic here is that
higher activity in pMFC after feedback was correlated with an increase in PES on
the post-error trial (Danielmeier et al., 2011) while decreases in motor network
activity on the post-error trial were related to a decrease in PES (J. A. King et
al., 2010).
A recent study combining effective and anatomical connectivity methods (Dynamic
Causal Modelling and diffusion based probabilistic tractography) showed that
the rIFG positively modulates the excitatory influence of the pre-SMA on the
STN, leading to stronger motor inhibition in motor cortex (Figure 1.2B, Rae,
Hughes, Anderson, & Rowe, 2015). Importantly, mean diffusivity in white matter
tracts connecting rIFG and preSMA to STN correlated with better performance
in inhibiting responses in a stop-signal task.
Extent of lesion damage to rIFG has previously been found to correlate with a
classical measure of response inhibition, the stop signal reaction time (SSRT) in
a stop signal task (Aron, Fletcher, Bullmore, Sahakian, & Robbins, 2003) and
temporary deactivation of the rIFG using transcranial magnetic stimulation lead
to the inability of stopping an action (Chambers et al., 2006).
Further, studies have shown that white matter integrity connecting the rIFG
and other areas relevant for cognitive control showed an association to response
inhibition performance (Fjell, Westlye, Amlien, & Walhovd, 2012; Madsen et al.,
2010).
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Figure 1.2: Major nodes of a prefrontal cognitive control network. (A) White
matter tracts connecting the right IFC, preSMA and STN are visualized using
Diffusion Weighted Imaging. Figure from Aron et al. (2007), reprinted with
permission from Society for Neuroscience. (B) Dynamic Causal Modelling of the
cognitive control network. The winning model configuration suggests a modulating
influence of IFG on the activity between preSMA and STN. Figure from Rae et al.
(2015), reprinted under CC BY 4.0 license.
Based on these results of a crucial role of rIFG in response inhibition, in Study
II we therefore evaluated the hypothesis whether cortical thickness in rIFG could
be related to decision components involved in post-error slowing.
1.3 Reinforcement learning
One of the largest influences on modern approaches to reinforcement learning are
behavioural studies in animals, carried out at the beginning of the last century. In
the framework of classical conditioning, Pavlov used the term “reinforcement” as
the repeated pairing between an unconditioned (e.g., food) and a neutral stimulus
(e.g., a bell) until the neutral stimulus by itself led to the response (e.g., dogs’
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salivation) previously only associated with the unconditioned stimulus (Pavlov,
1927). Thus, reinforcement here refers to an association between two stimuli.
Thorndike on the other hand specified an action-stimulus association in his Law
of Effect, derived from seminal experiments with cats (Thorndike, 1911). This law
pertains to the observation that behaviour that is followed by positive consequences
is likely going to be repeated in the future, e.g., a cat pressing a lever to escape a box
and obtain the fish outside the box, a process later on referred to as instrumental
or operant conditioning (Skinner, 1935). Modern computational approaches to
reinforcement learning implement both Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning
to model behaviour by utilizing algorithms from the field of machine learning
(Sutton & Barto, 1998).
A highly influential model depicting Pavlovian conditioning in animals was
developed by Rescorla & Wagner (1972). This model was particularly popular
as it could explain key behavioural findings in reinforcement learning such as
blocking (Niv, 2009). Blocking refers to the finding that a second conditioned
stimulus does not evoke a conditioned response if it does not provide additional
information beyond that of the first conditioned stimulus (Kamin, 1969).
Sutton and Barto (Sutton, 1988; Sutton & Barto, 1990) extended these ideas
with the concept of temporal difference learning, incorporating future rewards,
discounted by how far they were set apart in time. This can be a useful property
when trying to explain processes like second-order conditioning and conditioned
reinforcement (Niv & Schoenbaum, 2008). In second-order conditioning, a stimulus
that had previously been conditioned can then be associated with another stimulus
to construct a chain of associations. For example, an animal which has learned to
associate the ringing of a bell with food can be taught to associate a light with
the bell alone and through those contingencies learn a higher-order association
between light and food. Temporal difference learning has been successfully applied
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to describe this type of second-order conditioning in humans (Seymour et al.,
2004).
Here, the notion of a prediction error was also introduced, indicating the calculation
of a predicted reward minus the actual obtained reward. I will refer back to the
prediction error, particularly in terms of reward learning, in the section on neural
correlates of reinforcement learning.
Actions that lead to rewards are subsequently repeated. This is taken into
account in Q-learning models (Watkins, 1989; Watkins & Dayan, 1992). Here,
state-action pairs, instead of state-value pairs, are modelled as Q-values with the
“best” actions referring to the ones with the highest Q-values (Niv, 2009). The
estimated values can then also be used to calculate a prediction error. The SARSA
(state-action-reward-state-action) algorithm on the other hand is considered an
on-policy algorithm, meaning that the calculation of the prediction error only
involves the next chosen action, i.e., following the agent’s policy (Niv, 2009). In
recent years, both using Q-learning (e.g., FitzGerald, Friston, & Dolan, 2012;
Frank et al., 2007) and SARSA (e.g., Daw, 2011; Gläscher, Daw, Dayan, &
O’Doherty, 2010) algorithms to model human behaviour have proved to be useful
and reinforcement learning approaches have also improved performance of artificial
intelligence algorithms such as deep learning to match or improve upon human
performance (Mnih et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2017).
Furthermore, a division between model-free and model-based reinforcement learning
has also been proposed. While the former refers to the simple storing of action-value
correspondences without assuming a causal structure of the environment, the latter
emphasizes that decisions which lead to rewards are made through planning and
simulating the potential actions in a goal-directed manner (Botvinick & Weinstein,
2014). Whether these two different systems are also dissociable in terms of their
neural correlates is still being discussed, see e.g., Daw (2011) for evidence in
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favour of an integrated system, Gläscher et al. (2010) and Smittenaar, FitzGerald,
Romei, Wright, & Dolan (2013) for accounts of separable neural regions, S. W.
Lee, Shimojo, & O’Doherty (2014) for an arbitration mechanism between the two
systems, as well as Wunderlich, Smittenaar, & Dolan (2012) for the influence of
dopamine in that context.
1.3.1 Neural correlates of reinforcement learning
In their application to neuroscience, a crucial assumption underlies many of these
reinforcement learning models, namely the idea that the brain continually makes
predictions about its environment in order to maximize reward (Cohen, McClure,
& Yu, 2007; see also Friston & Kiebel, 2009; Niv, 2009).
One of the most intriguing findings bringing together computational approaches and
neural processes was the discovery that neurons expressing the neurotransmitter
dopamine in nonhuman primates not only reacted to rewarding stimuli but also
shifted their response towards a cue that could reliably predict an upcoming reward
while not firing when the actual reward was presented. Furthermore, a decrease
in firing rate was observed when the original reward was omitted at the expected
point in time. In other words, the phasic firing of these neurons seemed to achieve
a reward prediction error (Montague, Dayan, & Sejnowski, 1996; Schultz, Dayan,
& Montague, 1997, see Figure 1.3).
While not uncontroversial (Redgrave, Gurney, & Reynolds, 2008; Redgrave,
Prescott, & Gurney, 1999), this finding of a direct neural implementation of a
prediction error and the close association between dopamine and reinforcement
learning has inspired a lot of research in human neuroimaging, commonly
attributing neural correlates of reward prediction errors to the striatum (see e.g.,
Chase, Kumar, Eickhoff, & Dombrovski, 2015; Garrison, Erdeniz, & Done, 2013
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Figure 1.3: Dopamine neurons implement a reward prediction error. When no
conditioned stimulus (CS) is presented, dopamine neurons fire in response to a
reward R (top panel). When a CS such as a light is predictive of the reward,
the dopamine response shifts to firing after the CS instead (middle panel). If no
reward is presented even though it was predicted because of the light, there is
a dip in the dopaminergic neuron response at the time when the reward should
have appeared. Figure from Schultz et al. (1997), reprinted with permission from
AAAS.
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for recent reviews).
Several studies have shown that dopamine levels in the brain promote associative
learning in specific ways. Frank and colleagues, using a probabilistic learning
task, discovered that dopamine medication in Parkinson’s patients would make
them better at learning from positive than negative outcomes, while patients off
medication showed the opposite contrast (Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004).
Further, polymorphisms in genes related to dopamine function also showed a
direct relation to positive and negative learning styles. For example, participants
with variations in dopamine D2 receptor densities displayed differences in their
proneness to learn from or generalize to negative outcomes (Frank et al., 2007; T.
A. Klein et al., 2007).
Computational modelling has been effectively used in combination with
neuroimaging methods like fMRI to elucidate e.g., developmental changes in
reinforcement learning (Van Den Bos, Cohen, Kahnt, & Crone, 2012), risk
sensitivity (Niv, Edlund, Dayan, & O’Doherty, 2012) and deviations in reward
learning in mental disorders like depression (Kumar et al., 2008) and bulimia
nervosa (G. K. W. Frank, Reynolds, Shott, & O’Reilly, 2011). Neuroimaging
studies provided additional evidence that striatum and midbrain are involved
in the computation of reward prediction errors and implicate the ventromedial
prefrontal cortex in the estimation of values (Chase et al., 2015; Jocham, Klein, &
Ullsperger, 2011).
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1.4 The intersection of cognitive control and
reinforcement learning
How cognitive control processes can benefit value learning, override action
tendencies or sway neural processes to promote a more model-based or model-free
computation has only recently sparked investigations. For example, in a recent
study, cognitive control related measures in two tasks were associated with a
higher amount of model-based reward learning in a two-stage reinforcement
learning task (Otto, Skatova, Madlon-Kay, & Daw, 2015).
Yet, whether cognitive control can also have an impact on model-free reinforcement
learning is less well known. We have addressed this issue in Study I, demonstrating
that post-error slowing can have an impact on the generalization of learning in
a model-free reinforcement learning paradigm (Schiﬄer, Almeida, Granqvist, &
Bengtsson, 2016). Another study provided support that connectivity between
anterior cingulate cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex was associated with
adaptive switches in choice behaviour, integrating both immediate and delayed
consequences (Economides, Guitart-Masip, Kurth-Nelson, & Dolan, 2014). This
finding suggests a possible cognitive control process, foregoing the immediate
reward for a potentially larger delayed outcome.
Furthermore, the interaction between cognitive control and reward learning plays
an important role in mental disorders and can thus be a potential future target
for specific intervention. Particularly in addiction, self-control over prepotent
response habits is required to sustain abstinence. Volkow and colleagues showed
that instructed cognitive control of drug craving activated right inferior frontal
gyrus as a node in a cognitive control network while inhibiting reward related
regions, including nucleus accumbens and orbitofrontal cortex (Volkow et al.,
2010). As compulsive disorders show a habit towards model-free at the expense of
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model-based learning (Voon et al., 2015), further work on the relation of cognitive
control and reward learning styles could be beneficial to illuminate the ways in
which cognitive control can benefit abstinence and ultimately recovery from these
disorders.
1.5 Challenges
1.5.1 Is response adaptation like PES beneficial to
learning?
Whether PES provides specific benefits in acquisition or transfer in learning
paradigms is of yet unclear (Ullsperger & Danielmeier, 2016; Ullsperger et al.,
2014). For example, it is still to be determined under which conditions PES
is associated with post-error accuracy (Danielmeier & Ullsperger, 2011; Hajcak,
McDonald, & Simons, 2003; Hester, Barre, Mattingley, Foxe, & Garavan, 2007).
We address these questions in our Studies I and III (Schiﬄer et al., 2016; Schiﬄer,
Bengtsson, & Lundqvist, 2017), investigating learning benefits of PES and how
post-error decision components relate to stabilisation of accuracy.
1.5.2 How long do PES effects persist after an error?
A related question concerns for how long an error affects decision making. In
Study I, we investigated whether there was a memory component to PES in a
reinforcement learning task, i.e., whether participants would adapt their response
speed in relation to the negative feedback on certain symbol pairs. In Study
II, we teased apart the effects of negative feedback on immediate next trials and
delayed adaptation on later trials with regards to anatomical correlates. Finally, in
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Study III we investigated the persistence of post-error adaptations several trials
after the error in a visual search task.
1.5.3 What are the time courses and contributions to
accuracy of decision processes involved in PES?
Previous studies have found to varying degree that both increases in decision
threshold and reduced sensitivity to sensory information underlie PES. In Study
III, we explored how these altered decision components change over time and how
they contribute to the stabilisation of accuracy.
1.6 Computational modelling to tackle these
challenges
Advances in computer science, neuroscience and artificial intelligence prompted a
cognitive revolution in the 1950s which enabled psychology to look beyond the
black box of mental phenomena previously favoured by the predominant field of
behaviourism. One way to validate theories about mental processes is to utilize
computational models which can be fit to behavioural and/or neural data acquired
in experiments.
In this section I will present a general overview over the two main models used
in our studies. These are reinforcement learning models, which try to explain
how participants learn by estimating the stored value of task items and predicting
decisions based on these values and drift diffusion models, which are fit to reaction
times and accuracy in a given task to illuminate the underlying decision process.
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1.6.1 Reinforcement learning modelling
The central theme in reinforcement learning modelling questions how the value
of rewards in the environment impacts decision making. The Rescorla-Wagner
model of animal learning formalized how the value of a conditioned stimulus
(CS) changes in a classical conditioning paradigm dependent on the worth of the
actual unconditioned stimulus (US) (formula modified from Niv, 2009; Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972):
Vnew(CSi) = Vold(CSi) + α
[
λUS −
∑
i
Vold(CSi)
]
Here, learning of the association between US and CS happens because the new
value Vnew(CS1) of any of the conditioned stimuli (e.g., a light as CS1) gets updated
by adding the difference between what actually happened (e.g., a food pellet as
λUS) and what was predicted -
∑
i Vold(CSi) - to its old value Vold(CS1).
The importance of the difference between expected and predicted value was a
remarkable insight at the time and is one of the key components of reinforcement
learning models and other computational models of brain function even today. It
indicates the surprise of a particular outcome and is additionally modulated by a
learning rate α which reflects the importance of recency of rewards and can for
example vary depending on the salience of the stimuli involved (Niv, 2009).
This measure of surprise also found its way into reinforcement learning models
which are in active use in research today. In cognitive neuroscience, the measure of
the prediction error has received particular attention because of its close relation
with dopamine neuron firing (Schultz et al., 1997) as well as its correspondence to
dissociable model-free (i.e., reward-related) and model-based (i.e., state-related)
correlates in the brain (Gläscher et al., 2010). Analogous to the final term in
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the Rescorla-Wagner model, the prediction error can be calculated as follows by
subtracting the expected value of a stimulus V at timestep t from the current
value r at timestep t:
δt = rt − Vt
The full equation with which value updates can be estimated then looks like this:
Vt+1 = Vt + α ∗ δt
How do these stimulus values lead to a decision towards one or another option?
The computed values can be converted to action probabilities by the softmax
equation, in which for example the probability of choosing between stimulus A
and B at time t can be described as follows:
P (A)t =
1
1 + e−β(V (A)t−V (B)t)
In this formula, the difference between the values of stimuli A (V (A)t) and B
(V (B)t) is computed and adjusted by the inverse temperature parameter β, which
controls individuals’ propensity to explore new options versus exploit the known
value differences (albeit small as they might be). In other words, an increase in
the value for β suggests that a participant follows the computed value difference
more deterministically.
RL models have already been effectively applied to highlight previously unexplained
aspects of disorders (for a review see Maia & Frank, 2011) such as Parkinson’s
disease (Frank et al., 2004), Schizophrenia (Roiser et al., 2009) and in explaining
model-based versus model-free behaviour (Doll, Simon, & Daw, 2012) which might
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be of future use to explain pathologies.
1.6.2 Drift diffusion modelling
The fundamental question how mental computations can be inferred from measured
reaction times dates back almost 150 years. Already in 1870 and based on earlier
computations on nerve conduction velocity by von Helmholtz (1850), Foster
described the principle on which today’s drift diffusion models (DDM) base their
computations, namely the division of overt reaction time into the unobservable
components of sensory acquisition, mental computation, and motor output: “A
typical bodily action, involving mental effort, may be regarded as made up of
three terms ; of sensations travelling towards the brain, of processes thereby set
up within the brain, and of resultant motor impulses travelling from the brain
towards the muscles which are about to be used” (Foster, 1870).
Modern sequential sampling models, of which DDMs are one subclass, rely on
the idea that during speeded decision-making tasks, evidence towards one of the
options is acquired in a noisy manner until it reaches a decision boundary, after
which a motor action is being executed (Forstmann, Ratcliff, & Wagenmakers,
2016). DDMs have usually been applied to two-alternative forced choice tasks
(2AFC), although extensions to include tasks with multiple alternatives have also
been discussed (Forstmann et al., 2016; Ratcliff, Smith, Brown, & McKoon, 2016).
Prominent parameters in these models include the decision threshold a, the rate
of evidence accumulation v, and the non-decision time Ter, which consists of time
needed for both sensory acquisition as well as motor execution (see Figure 1.4
for a graphical overview of the DDM and its core parameters). While a reflects
how much evidence is necessary to make a decision towards one of the options
presented, v indicates the slope at which this evidence is acquired.
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These three parameters relate to RT and accuracy in a particular fashion (Table
1.1). The decision threshold a corresponds to increases in response caution with
an increase in both RT and accuracy. The evidence accumulation v is related
to decreases in RT and simultaneous increases in accuracy and is sensitive to
for example task difficulty (higher difficulty leads to decreased v). Finally, the
non-decision time Ter corresponds to an increase in RT with no concurrent change
in accuracy and is hypothesized to be for example affected by aging (Ratcliff,
Thapar, & McKoon, 2010), although Ratcliff et al. (2010) also find increasing
decision thresholds with advancing age.
Table 1.1: Core parameters of drift diffusion models and their relation to RT,
accuracy, and proposed correlates.
DDM Parameter RT Accuracy Proposed correlates
Decision threshold a ↑ ↑ Response caution
Drift rate v ↓ ↑ Task difficulty
Non-decision time Ter ↑ = Aging
Using reaction time distributions and response accuracy in combination allows
for example to explain differences in experimental conditions (Forstmann et al.,
2016 for reviews; see Ratcliff et al., 2016) or between patient groups, such as in
schizophrenia (A. A. Moustafa et al., 2015), Parkinson’s disease (Zhang et al.,
2016) or in patients with psychosis (Mathias et al., 2017) to particular mental
processes within the total reaction time.
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Figure 1.4: Main parameters of the canonical drift diffusion model for decisions in
two-alternative forced-choice tasks. Two example diffusion processes as random
walks are depicted alongside the three main parameters of the drift diffusion model.
Evidence for one or the other option is accumulated with a drift-rate v until one
of the two decision boundaries which are separated by the decision threshold a is
crossed. The total non-decision time Ter can be divided in an afferent part (sensory
perception) and an efferent part (movement initiation and execution).
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Chapter 2
Aims
The central aim of the studies presented in this thesis was to investigate which
aspects of cognitive control processes in reaction to negative feedback benefit
learning and how this is reflected in both brain anatomy and function.
In Study I we used a probabilistic reinforcement learning paradigm to assess
the influence of cognitive control adjustments such as post-error slowing and
stay/switch-behaviour in addition to learning phase performance as predictors
for learning outcome in a later test phase. In addition, we were interested
in which neural areas predicted later response time adaptation at the time of
receiving negative feedback. Further, we analyzed how trial-by-trial absolute and
signed prediction errors obtained from our reinforcement learning models affected
behaviour and how they were represented in the brain. Data for this study was
acquired in the context of a larger ongoing project which investigates the influence
of self-associations on learning using priming techniques. Therefore we controlled
for this factor in all analyses of Studies I and II in which this was possible.
Given converging evidence from previous research (e.g., Aron et al., 2007, 2014;
Rae et al., 2015) and the interesting results from Study I which implicated the
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right inferior frontal cortex as an important region in cognitive control processes,
we investigated in Study II whether an anatomical property of this area, cortical
thickness, was related to the extent and memory aspects of PES. We also used drift
diffusion modelling to better understand the dominant cognitive process behind
post-error slowing and related obtained parameters to anatomical structure of the
rIFC.
Using a visual search task, in Study III we explored the effect of an error on
not only the first trial after the error, but also on subsequent trials. This was
again supported by drift diffusion models to reveal the relevant decision process
components behind reaction times and accuracy. Additionally, we examined how
trial type properties (emotion and difficulty) influenced post-error adaptations
and how later increases in accuracy were associated with decision processes on the
trial after an error.
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Chapter 3
Methodological Considerations
In this chapter I will provide an outline of the main techniques used in our studies
with a focus on neuroimaging techniques and computational modelling.
3.1 Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) is a non-invasive imaging technique that
utilizes the fact that different tissue types have different magnetic properties
to provide high-resolution images of anatomy such as the brain. To make this
possible, a strong magnetic field, commonly in the range of 1.5 - 7 Tesla for human
brain imaging, is created by an MRI scanner, which aligns the nuclei of (e.g.,
hydrogen) atoms in a common direction. The transient introduction of a varying
electromagnetic field (B1) by a radiofrequency pulse leads to excitation and a
dephasing of the nuclei. Now it becomes for example possible to measure how long
it takes the nuclei to return back to their original state (the so-called spin-lattice
relaxation time or T1 relaxation). This property is used in neuroimaging to provide
the so-called T1 contrast, which enables a detailed visualization of differences
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Figure 3.1: Cortical thickness is calculated using the shortest distance between
pial surface and white surface. Image was created with the tool TkMedit after
running the FreeSurfer standard processing pipeline on one example brain from
Study II.
between e.g., grey and white matter in the brain. We make use of the T1 contrast
in Study II to assess inter-subject differences in cortical thickness depending on
individual propensity to adapt response speed after an error.
Cortical thickness is a MRI-derived metric which has been successfully used as
a measure of the integrity of the cerebral cortex (e.g., Dickerson & Wolk, 2012;
Makris et al., 2007). It decreases with normal aging (Storsve et al., 2014) and
can be related to symptom severity with corresponding regionally specific rates
of decrease in Alzheimer’s disease (Dickerson et al., 2009). Using freely available
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tools such as FreeSurfer (Fischl & Dale, 2000), cortical thickness can be calculated
by taking the smallest distance between the pial surface (boundary between grey
matter and cerebrospinal fluid) and the white surface (boundary between grey
matter and white matter), as detailed in Figure 3.1.
3.2 Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
Ideally, in cognitive neuroscience we would like to observe neuronal activity directly
and relate it to ongoing cognitive processes as for example probed in closely
controlled experimental studies. However, this is not yet possible in a non-invasive
fashion today. Instead, we use a proxy to neuronal activity, the so-called Blood
Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) contrast (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & Tank, 1990).
This contrast relies on the fact that the deoxyhemoglobin concentration in the
blood changes when more oxygen is being consumed, for example because the
participant is currently doing a decision-making task and active brain areas need
to be supplied with more oxygen. This physiological change in deoxyhemoglobin
concentration changes the magnetic properties of water molecules which is then
measurable by MRI. The concept of BOLD-based functional MRI (fMRI) relies on
this indirect measure to assess neural activity in the form of local field potentials
(Logothetis, Pauls, Augath, Trinath, & Oeltermann, 2001). We make use of fMRI
and the BOLD contrast in particular in Study I using Statistical Parametric
Mapping (SPM, Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging, UCL, London, United
Kingdom) as the analysis tool.
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3.3 Reinforcement Learning Modelling
We used a standard RL model in Study I to investigate participant’s choices and
their learning progress. Because we assumed that participants learn differently
from positive and negative feedback, we estimated two learning rates, αpos and
αneg, respectively. We initialized all weights at 0, the two learning rates at 0.5 (with
0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and a beta distributed prior) and the inverse temperature parameter
β at 1 (with β ≥ 0 and a normal distributed prior with mean = 0 and standard
deviation =
√
10).
On a trial-by-trial basis, stimulus values were estimated via the following formula:
Qt+1 = Qt + α(pos/neg) ∗ δt
with the prediction errors δt calculated as:
δt = rt −Qt
Action probabilities (here for symbol A in pair AB) were estimated using the
softmax equation:
P (A)t =
1
1 + e−β(Q(A)t−Q(B)t)
Further, we calculated a trial-by-trial confidence measure by putting the action
tendency estimated in the softmax equation in relation to 0.5:
Conf(AB)t = |0.5− P (A)t|
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3.4 Hierarchical Bayesian Estimation of the
Drift Diffusion Model (HDDM)
To model latent decision processes of PES in Studies I and II we used a toolbox
which allows the estimation of the drift diffusion model in a hierarchical Bayesian
fashion (HDDM, Wiecki, Sofer, & Frank, 2013). In contrast to traditional ways
of estimating diffusion models, the hierarchical Bayesian analysis assumes that
parameters for individuals can be drawn from the group distribution and that an
uncertainty around the parameters can also be estimated. A major benefit of this
type of analysis is that far fewer trials per condition are needed for each individual
participant to get reasonable parameter estimates as the individual parameter
estimates are constrained by the group estimates (Ratcliff & Childers, 2015; Wiecki
et al., 2013). In our studies, we mainly focused on the three main parameters of
the DDM: The decision threshold a, the rate of evidence accumulation v, and the
non-decision time Ter. The reaction time slowing after an error can be described
by either an increase in decision threshold, a decrease in evidence accumulation or
an increase in the non-decision time, see Figure 3.2. Teasing these contributions
apart was particularly our goal in Study III.
3.5 Post-error slowing
Traditionally, post-error slowing has been calculated by comparing average RT on
post-error trials with average RT on post-correct trials. However, this method
neglects the fact that errors might also cluster in certain parts of the experiment,
e.g., at the end when general attention is low because participants are getting tired.
It is therefore advisable to take this into account and subtract post-error RTs from
associated pre-error RTs (so-called ∆RT) instead so that global fluctuations over
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Figure 3.2: Purported decision process changes underlying post-error slowing.
All three changes portrayed lead to a decrease in RT. However, changes in the
respective parameters of the drift diffusion model map uniquely to changes in
accuracy. While decision threshold increases predict corresponding increases in
accuracy, decreases in evidence accumulation will lead to lower accuracy, and
changes in non-decision time do not affect accuracy.
the course of the experiment are being taken into account (Dutilh et al., 2012a).
In our studies, we also control for trial type differences in RT by comparing trials
of the same trial condition. For Studies I and II, we calculate PES in accordance
with previous research on post-error slowing in a reinforcement learning task design
(Cavanagh et al., 2010; Frank et al., 2007) by subtracting post-error RT for the
next same pair from RT on the error trial. For Study III, we calculate PES by
subtracting post-error RT from pre-error RT if they are of the same trial type
(neutral/angry/happy).
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3.6 Participants
For Studies I and II we recruited a total of 48 healthy participants who gave
written informed consent before participating in the study. In Study III, 6,047
participants took part in the study which was presented at an art exhibition at
Nationalmuseum in Stockholm, Sweden. Detailed information about the aims of
the research was given to participants both on the TV screen for the experiment
and on text panels of the installation and consent was implied by participants
voluntarily initiating the task.
37
Chapter 4
Results
4.1 Study I: Post-error slowing is associated
with learning performance and functional
activity in cognitive control and visual
regions
4.1.1 Relation of learning phase measures to the testing
phase
In a multiple regression model, we found that both learning phase accuracy on
the main symbol pair (AB) and PES during the learning phase were positively
associated with testing phase performance (Correlation between PES during
learning phase and test score in Figure 4.1A), while the number of times participants
decided to stay with the same decision after negative feedback or switch to the
other option was not directly related to test phase performance.
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Figure 4.1: Main results of Study I. (A) Positive correlation between memory-based
post-error slowing and test phase performance across participants. (B) fMRI
activity of brain areas while receiving negative feedback, related to amount of
slowing on the next same pair trial (red-yellow) and to absolute prediction error
(green), as well as the conjunction between both (blue). Figures from Schiﬄer et
al., 2016, reprinted with permission from MIT Press.
We did not find a correlation of PES with overall accuracy of any of the symbol
pairs during the learning phase. Testing phase scores also demonstrated that
participants performed better in the test phase on new symbol combinations which
were easier. For example, the choice between symbol A which was reinforced at an
80% probability during the learning phase and symbol D, which was reinforced at
30% should be easier than the choice between A and C (80%/70%), see Figure 4.2.
4.1.2 Feedback-congruent staying/shifting
As expected, participants on average repeated decisions more often when they
were reinforced by positive feedback compared to negative feedback. A general
working memory component as indicated by feedback congruent behaviour in the
beginning of the task (Frank et al., 2007) was not significantly related to PES.
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Figure 4.2: Test scores divided by symbol pair combinations. During the test
phase of the task, the symbols A and B from the learning phase are now tested
separately against all other symbols learned. Green colour represents easier symbol
combinations (AD: 80%/30% probability of positive reinforcement, AF: 80%/40%,
BC: 20%/70%, BE: 20%/60%) and orange represents more difficult combinations
(AC: 80%/70%, AE: 80%/60%, BD: 20%/30%, BF: 20%/40%). Error bars reflect
standard error of the mean.
4.1.3 fMRI activity associated with PES
On the event of receiving negative feedback, activity in right inferior frontal
cortex and bilateral occipital cortex tracked the response speed adjustment on the
following relevant trial (Figure 4.1B).
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4.1.4 Reinforcement learning model measures
4.1.4.1 Prediction errors and their neural correlates
Prediction errors estimated from our reinforcement learning model were associated
with post-error slowing. More unexpected negative feedback lead to an increase
in slowing both on the direct next trial and on the next relevant (same pair)
trial while more unexpected positive feedback was followed by a speed increase.
Negative prediction errors correlated with brain activity in left striatum as assessed
by an a priori ROI analysis and absolute (i.e., unsigned) prediction errors over all
feedback evoked activity in similar brain regions as the main PES analysis.
4.1.4.2 Learning rate
We had estimated two separate learning rates for positive and negative feedback in
accordance with previous research (Kahnt et al., 2009; Van Den Bos et al., 2012)
to investigate whether participants who showed stronger reactivity to negative
feedback (e.g., increased slowing or switching to the other symbol) showed a
learning pattern which focuses on recent feedback in contrast to the whole history
(i.e., a high learning rate). We found this pattern for switch behaviour, but not
for post-error slowing. This means that the model estimated a higher negative
learning rate for participants who switched their choice to the other symbol
following negative feedback.
4.1.4.3 Confidence
Confidence measures as extracted by our RL model also showed a negative relation
to PES (i.e., lower confidence lead to an increase in ∆RT).
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4.1.4.4 Model validation
We simulated model predictions by taking the final model parameters (αpos,neg and
β) and averaged over 10,000 repetitions of simulated behaviour for each participant.
The model was able to reproduce the learning curves present in the acquired data
as well as the differentiation in accuracy between the three different symbol pairs
at the end of the training phase.
4.2 Study II: Adaptive increases in response
caution after errors are related to cortical
thickness in cognitive control regions
4.2.1 Drift diffusion correlates of PES in a reinforcement
learning design
Post-error trials, compared to post-correct trials, were defined by an increase in
decision threshold but there was no difference in the rate of evidence accumulation
(Figure 4.3A,B).
This indicates that error trials evoke increased response caution in this task design
but not necessarily decreases in evidence accumulation. Against our expectations,
an interaction between the distance to the next same pair trial and the rate of
evidence accumulation was not supported by the data. These findings suggest
that memory-based PES is an adaptive cognitive control process because the RT
increases in this experiment contributed to accuracy as shown by the increase in
response caution.
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Figure 4.3: Main results of Study II. (A) Posterior probability density of
decision threshold parameter regression estimate for post-error trials compared
to post-correct trials. (B) Posterior probability density of evidence accumulation
parameter regression estimate for post-error trials compared to post-correct trials.
(C) Vertex based analysis showing clusters in which rIFG thickness is positively
associated with ∆RT. (D) Correlation between average ∆RT and average rIFG
cortical thickness when partialing out the effects of age, sex and prime. Shaded
area indicates 95% confidence interval of the regression line.
4.2.2 PES is related to cortical thickness in rIFC
We found that overall cortical thickness of rIFC correlated with PES, both if
the same pair was the direct next trial after the error and if there was at least
one other symbol pair in between. Post-hoc correlations and a follow-up vertex
wise analysis both demonstrated that the strongest association of PES was to the
anterior part of rIFC (Figure 4.3C,D), in pars orbitalis (particularly for longer
distances) and pars triangularis (especially for immediate next trials).
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4.2.3 Response caution increases after errors directly
relate to cortical thickness in rIFC
Using participants’ parameters of decision threshold and evidence accumulation
adaptation on post-error trials compared to post-correct trials, we showed that
anatomical variability in rIFC, particularly in pars orbitalis, related to decision
threshold adaptations on the trial after the error.
4.3 Study III: Response adaptations to errors
are multi-component processes and change
dynamically over several trials after the
error
4.3.1 Dynamics of latent decision processes after errors
In this study, we have found that reactions are marked by sustained increases
in response caution over several trials and transient decreases in evidence
accumulation, most prominent on the direct next trial after the error (Figure
4.4A).
Further, we also found that non-decision time was reduced for several trials
post-error. This indicates that in our experiment, multiple decision processes were
affected simultaneously by the error and give rise to the particular pattern of
post-error slowing.
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Figure 4.4: Main results of Study III. (A) Decision process components contributing
to post-error slowing over several trials after an error. While decision threshold a
showed a sustained increase even several trials after an error (orange) compared
to post-correct trials (green), an initial post-error dip in evidence accumulation v
increased over the following trials. Non-decision time Ter (not shown) displayed a
sustained decrease for post-error trials relative to post-correct trials. (B) Relation
of decision process parameters on the first trial after an error to accuracy on the
following five trials. Higher decision thresholds a and evidence accumulation v as
well as lower non-decision time Ter immediately post-error were associated with
no mistakes on the following five trials compared to at least one mistake. Figures
from Schiﬄer et al., 2017, adapted under CC BY 4.0 license.
4.3.2 How do downstream accuracy increases rely on
post-error adaptation?
Post-error trials which were followed by five correct trials were marked by higher
decision thresholds, higher rates of evidence accumulation and lower non-decision
times (Figure 4.4B).
4.3.3 Effects of error properties on decision making
We found differences in post-error decision processes both by emotional valence and
difficulty of stimuli. These variations had specific effects on the rate of evidence
accumulation. It was reduced both for generally more difficult trials and following
angry error trials compared to happy error trials.
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Chapter 5
Discussion
Can appropriate response adaptation to negative feedback support learning? Our
studies presented in this thesis suggest that this is indeed generally the case, but
that there are also potentially detrimental components which need to be recognized.
5.1 Behavioural results in Studies I - III
In Studies I and II we have presented evidence that PES in a RL context
can benefit learning outcome. Study I demonstrated that there are long-term
learning outcome benefits if participants adapt their response speed to the negative
feedback received. Interestingly, the effect that we found for PES on testing
phase performance was similar in magnitude to the effect of overall learning phase
performance in the main symbol pair AB on the test score. This is somewhat
surprising as being able to clearly differentiate between the value of these two
symbols as indicated by accuracy on pair AB during the learning phase should be
a strong predictor for performance during the test phase in which symbols A and
B are separately pitted against all other symbols.
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These findings extend the literature on beneficial and adverse effects of PES on
learning by showing that error monitoring processes after negative feedback can be
an indicator for later learning outcome as stipulated by Ridderinkhof and colleagues
(2004). This suggests that negative feedback is encoded at the time of receiving the
feedback to drive future response adaptations. This finding emphasizes encoding
of feedback as a crucial phase for subsequent changes in behaviour, which may
have implications for structuring learning exercises, e.g., in the classroom.
In Study II, we showed that PES also has a positive effect during the initial
learning phase of the task. The increase in RT was associated with an increase
in the decision threshold, which signals that participants made more cautious
(and thus on average more correct) decisions after errors. This finding is not
very surprising, given that post-error adaptations in general have previously been
associated with increases in response caution (Dutilh et al., 2012b) and that in a
different reinforcement learning task, decision threshold has been linked to decision
conflict (Frank et al., 2015). The result reiterates that the additional time that is
often being taken after errors is beneficial to learning performance.
Study III provided evidence for both functional and potentially maladaptive
decision components in the process of post-error slowing. While response caution
persisted at elevated levels even several trials after the error, reductions in evidence
accumulation were mainly present for the first post-error trial, suggesting only a
transient disruption of decision making by the error.
Reduced evidence accumulation and increased decision boundaries have also been
found in a motion direction discrimination task (Purcell & Kiani, 2016), although
that study did not find any differences in non-decision time. However, in our case,
the non-decision time was reduced following errors, i.e., this part of the decision
process did not contribute to post-error slowing.
Our findings align with a recent conceptual proposal, which suggests both
47
co-occurring increases in response threshold and decreases in sensitivity to sensory
information which together lead to initial decreases in accuracy and eventual
recovery over future trials (Ullsperger & Danielmeier, 2016).
Interestingly, these results as predicted by the aforementioned theory stand in
contrast to Laming’s (1979) original findings that RT recovers faster after an error
than task accuracy, possibly due to differences in the task being used or in the
way that post-error slowing was calculated.
5.2 Neuroimaging results in Studies I and II
In Studies I and II, we show that PES was associated with both function
and anatomy of the rIFG, an important cognitive control region in the brain.
Specifically, anatomical variability in cortical thickness in this area reflected
participants’ decision threshold adaptations after errors, suggesting a possibility
that there are markers of propensity to error adaptation in the human brain which
can be investigated in further research. Functional activity in rIFG when receiving
the error feedback was positively associated with response time slowing on the
next relevant trial.
In similar previous analyses, activity in dorsolateral PFC (Kerns et al., 2004) and
pMFC (Danielmeier et al., 2011) on the error trial predicted RT slowing on the
post-error trial. Hester and colleagues also demonstrated that error activity in
pMFC predicted accuracy on the next same target stimulus, even if that trial was
several trials ahead in the future (Hester, Madeley, Murphy, & Mattingley, 2009).
Further, activity in bilateral IFG has previously been associated with successful
instrumental learning (Guitart-Masip et al., 2012).
It is unlikely that there exists only one single region in PFC which determines
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response adaptations like PES, but that instead several areas cooperate to
implement the response speed adjustments in cooperation with primary motor
areas, the pre-SMA and subcortical regions like the STN (Siegert et al., 2014).
Further, these areas likely interact with regions which have been consistently
shown to be involved in error monitoring like pMFC and ACC. Our contribution
in the studies presented here is that lateral PFC, and more specifically rIFG, is
directly involved in signalling the need for a future more cautious response after
receiving the feedback, not only for suppressing the motor output on the post-error
trial. Future studies which focus on functional or anatomical network approaches
(as e.g., in Rae et al., 2015) will be able to provide a more comprehensive answer
to these questions.
5.3 Limitations and future directions
Particularly for our drift diffusion modelling we have employed a method which
enables accurate parameter estimation even when trial amounts are low. However,
for the particular conditions we wanted to investigate, we still encountered problems
in convergence and had to make compromises on the model structure (i.e., model
the data on group level in Study III and reduce model complexity in Study II)
to assure convergence of the models. Even though we had a lot of participants
in Study III and the direction of almost all parameter estimates when including
individual level modelling was the same as for the group models, the trial amount
per participant should still be increased to also get stable individual parameter
estimates.
Further, it is important to consider that the PES effects we have observed here differ
between the presented studies due to the intricacies of the two experimental designs.
Particularly, this concerns the memory-based aspect of PES in Study I and II
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compared to a more conventional visual search task in Study III. While adaptation
of response speed in line with previous relevant feedback is reasonable and has
previously been found in other studies employing the same type of probabilistic
reinforcement learning task (Cavanagh et al., 2010; Frank et al., 2007), this might
constitute a different aspect of PES than what has historically been classified as
PES. For example, one recurring finding in PES research (Danielmeier & Ullsperger,
2011; see e.g., Jentzsch & Dudschig, 2009) is that the slowing is greater when the
response to stimulus interval is smaller (i.e., the closer the time from feedback to
onset of next stimulus). In our first two studies, a considerable amount of time
could pass between a particular feedback and the next relevant trial (on average 20
seconds between feedback and next same pair in comparison to traditional studies
of PES in which the response to stimulus interval is usually below one second).
As such, the received negative feedback needs to be stored in some way until the
participant recognizes the same pair for the next time. What we investigate in the
first two studies could thus involve a more cognitive aspect of post-error slowing
than has been conventionally examined.
In Study I and II, the PES effect was also comparatively smaller to PES in
Study III. This might be because there were few error trials in the latter study
which bias the analysis of post-error reactions towards initial encounters of errors.
Conceivably, these initial errors might provoke a stronger post-error reaction, but
this hypothesis would need to be tested in future studies.
Another interesting aspect for future research concerns the question how errors
in deterministic decision-making tasks differ from probabilistic negative feedback
often given in reinforcement learning task designs with regard to involvement of
brain areas associated with cognitive control. One possibility is that while the
former feedback evokes a similar response independent of the current stage of the
task, the latter might lead to decreasing engagement of relevant cognitive control
structures when the value of a particular stimulus is already certain (e.g., in later
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phases of a task).
Finally, I believe that both the fields of cognitive control and reinforcement learning
will benefit immensely from research on dynamic functional connectivity (R. M.
Hutchison et al., 2013; Thompson, Brantefors, & Fransson, 2017). The promise
of focusing on the dynamics of brain activity lies in the potential to elucidate
the brain networks contributing to processes such as post-error slowing on a
moment-to-moment basis and how these networks interact with other brain areas
to promote learning.
For the studies presented here, this would mean that the findings about rIFG
and potential feature processing regions in occipital cortex could be embedded
in a larger context of how they work together with other nodes like medial PFC,
STN and pre-SMA in a network which regulates decision threshold adaptations
(Cavanagh, Sanguinetti, Allen, Sherman, & Frank, 2014; Cavanagh et al., 2011;
Frank et al., 2015; Herz, Zavala, Bogacz, & Brown, 2016; Rae et al., 2015) and
with areas in the brain encoding the value or deviance from expected value of
relevant stimuli such as striatal areas like the nucleus accumbens (Niv et al., 2012).
A concrete example of how the interaction of those networks could be probed
is by combining experimental paradigms which have usually been used to evoke
specific brain activity in relation to cognitive control and reinforcement learning.
For example, it could be possible to first “load” certain stimuli (e.g., faces and
houses) with high and low value by reinforcing them and then in a second
phase use these stimuli in e.g., a Go/No-Go task to determine how the previous
reinforcement affects cognitive control performance (see e.g., Freeman, Razhas, &
Aron, 2014 for an example of combining a conditioning task with a Go/No-Go
task). With proper orthogonalization of stimuli (e.g., using dimensions of face
characteristics and type of house in the Go/No-Go task), specific hypotheses about
the involved brain networks could then be tested. Of particular interest could
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be an interaction of cognitive control network areas with both reward related
networks and stimulus-specific association parts of the brain (Danielmeier et al.,
2011; Schiffer, Muller, Yeung, & Waszak, 2014). This would provide a more
comprehensive picture of the role of value in cognitive control. It could potentially
even be used to inform research on clinical disorders such as addiction by asking
why prepotent action tendencies associated with reward can sometimes not easily
be controlled, verifying earlier findings of involvement of rIFC in inhibiting craving
(Tabibnia et al., 2011; Volkow et al., 2010).
Returning to Foster’s original vision to decompose reaction times into decision
components, we now have the computational tools available to do so on increasingly
larger amounts of data. For example in clinical populations, making use of that
computational power to investigate differences in decision processes promises
substantial information gain compared to earlier, more coarse approaches and can
aid in bringing forth the emerging field of computational psychiatry (Huys, Maia,
& Frank, 2016; Maia & Frank, 2011; Montague, Dolan, Friston, & Dayan, 2012).
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